Beyond a Ceasefire: Peacebuilding in Palestine and International Territorial Administration

A year on from the horrific terror attacks on October the 7th and with tens of thousands of civilians dead, peace and the possibility of justice in Palestine feel impossible in light of the harrowing day-to-day experiences of Palestinians and Israelis. Nevertheless, it is worth considering what fate awaits the people between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea beyond a ceasefire. Where the status quo is clearly unworkable, how can we build peace and manifest justice? What systems of governance can be built to provide justice and peace for the future? Are there examples that we can learn from in order not to repeat historical mistakes?

These questions are too vast and multifaceted for an article such as this, and frankly, are best answered by local Palestinian and Israeli thought-leaders and legal scholars. However, one potential future being suggested directly relates to the international community’s role in peacebuilding and was the topic of my undergraduate thesis so merits some discussion here. The proposal that is quietly gaining traction in some diplomatic and legal circles is a suggestion that after the conflict, the United Nations deploy an Interim Administration in Palestine to deal with the aftermath of the conflict and build domestic institutions for the future.

International Caretakers: What is international territorial administration?

This kind of “international territorial administration” (ITA) is not a new phenomenon and it, in fact, has a long and troublesome history. More recently it has been used in Kosovo (United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)) and Timor-Leste (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)) to varying levels of success. But this kind of international response traces its roots back through the history of the United Nations, its precursor the League of Nations, and arguably all the way to colonialism. At its worst, it is an internationalised version of colonialism, founded on the same assumption that a given people is not ‘ready’ to govern themselves peacefully. At best, it can be seen as a pragmatic response to the complex tensions amongst local actors by a caring international community. The difference between these two views, and the spectrum of perspectives between them is a matter of execution. So, the question then is, should the UN conduct an interim administration in Palestine, how can this be legitimised and serve the needs of the people, justice, and peace?

Consenting to Subjugation?

One core component that could serve to legitimise such a project would be the consent of the given population, in this case, the Palestinian and Israeli people. I note this as, in previous examples of this kind of project, consent has not been forthcoming, and the projects have rather been imposed on the population in a ‘civilising’ manner that echoes colonial protectorates and the mandate and trusteeship systems that followed the World Wars. In East Timor, for example, despite conducting a consultation (referendum) in which the population of East Timor chose to be independent, the UN still decided to run the State for 3 years. In Kosovo, consent was procured following an “illegal but legitimate”(1) NATO bombing campaign(2) that coerced the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) into agreeing to the Peace Plan. Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina NATO bombing campaign ‘Operation Deliberate Force’ was “generally regarded”(3) to have brought the parties to the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreements which in turn included the treaty basis for the Office of Human Rights’ (the administrative organ’s) powers. These interventions, like the potential one in Palestine, are important and driven by the horrors that precede them where the international community feels the need to step in and help. However, where this help is imposed on a given population, as it has been in the above cases, it might damage the legitimacy of the project and undermine its long-term goals of securing justice and delivering peace. Given the complex political and social histories often present in instances where ITA is implemented, what is a suitable level of consent that would legitimise an ITA project? In Palestine, where local governance capacities have been so deeply damaged by the conflict, the possibility of democratically elected leaders agreeing on an ITA framework seems impossible. Similarly, a popular consultation, whilst ideal, would be almost impossible to implement immediately given the grave levels of displacement and destruction. Therefore, such an ITA may only foreseeably be consented to by the warring parties. This is not without its inadequacies, but without this, such an ITA will surely fail and as such, pragmatically this may be our only measure of consent.

Is the International Community in a Position to Govern Equitably?

Other factors beyond consent could have a role in supporting peacebuilding in Palestine. One key factor is the international nature of the potential administering powers. As we have seen already, the potential of a local power, for example an Israeli administration in Gaza, would be unworkable and would not lead to peace but further stoke the conflict. Equally, Israel and their Western allies would likely be uncomfortable with a Hamas-affiliated governing-power in Palestine. The complexities of these local actors and their relations with each other and the international community would need to be resolved, but for an interim administration, one would simply need to ensure that international actors are viewed as neutral and principled by the local actors. This is admittedly easier said than done as the perception of the efficacy and morality of the international community has been severely eroded throughout this conflict. The polarisation of the international community over this issue further reduces the likelihood of other states being trusted by both parties simultaneously. This combined with a lack of trust in the institutional soundness of the United Nations (especially the Security Council) and manifests formidable challenges in securing a truly just international actor who would be able to build a trusting peace in the region.

Does a lack of trust in the international system doom any form of ITA?

At the core of this difficulty in building trust is that there has been an erosion in the supposed universality of the values that underpin the international system. In a conflict where parties have regularly acted contrary to their obligations under international law, there is a global tide of distrust in the rules-based order. For a system of international territorial administration to be legitimised, the principles at its heart should be universal and respected. This is perhaps a more fundamental question touching at the heart of what we conceive international justice to be (for more discussion on this topic see “Rethinking International Law After Gaza: A Symposium and a Call to Action”). Nevertheless, should an ITA system be implemented, there must be assurances at an embryonic stage that under such a system all lives, Palestinian and Israeli, will be treated with equal respect and protection. Failing this, trust in the international legal and humanitarian order will be further undermined to a point, I fear, of destruction.

The question remains: What comes after?

Finally, and fundamentally, the ITA must be temporary. Should the ITA extend indefinitely, it will directly echo systems of colonial rule where an external power, deeming the local populus unable to govern themselves, instead steps in and takes control with an indeterminate mandate. Such a system is unsatisfying to all local actors and can allow tensions to boil under the surface, exploding in unexpected areas. In Kosovo for example, the UN mission has no sunset clause, relying on the parties arriving at a “final settlement”(4) whereupon the UN will transfer authority. This effectively means that there was, and remains, no guarantee of self-determination. This failure to ensure the right to self-determination creates more tension than it dissipates and leaves open space for growing division as the final settlement remains negotiable. This has been manifested in Kosovo with further tensions between Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo, manifested in their separate education systems and increased ethnic violence. Similarly, should the Palestinian people continue to be denied their entitlement to self-determination, it is highly likely that division will continue to grow and that acts of violence and revenge will not decrease. Such an international administration must therefore lay the groundwork for the final settlement which follows, an overwhelmingly difficult task. Pragmatically, the enormity of this may require the international community to forego detail in the interests of bringing about an immediate pause to hostilities, such is the balance between justice and peace. Nevertheless, talking to a diverse range of people in Kosovo I have seen firsthand how the lack of certainty over a potential final settlement merely postpones the conflict, driving it underground. By not addressing the fundamental questions of justice and reconciliation the peace process is marred by the historical injustices at the root of the conflict, making any lasting peace merely illusory.

Conclusion

On this grim anniversary, we should listen to and be moved by those most affected by this tragedy. If you are interested in this area of international justice and peacebuilding, read and engage with those voices who may be hard to hear. This article has merely been an introduction to a potential future solution; a look beyond the current violence to try to avoid further violence in the future. Some form of international territorial administration is likely to occur. After all, the devastation has created quantities of rubble that will take more than 15 years to clear (5) in Gaza alone. Of course, this is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg when one reflects on the horror and devastation that cannot be measured in tonnes of rubble. When such an ITA system is implemented, the international community should be minded to consult the people of Palestine, both Arab and Israeli, if they wish for their administration to operate with the trust of these communities. Failing this consent, trust in the international and neutral nature of the actors, the universality of the principles underpinning the administration, and even the timeframe of the mandate may be so severely undermined as to jeopardise peace in the region and the international legal order more widely.

Bring these arguments and discussions into your lives. Justice is a muscle that needs to be flexed in all of our minds and lives to stay healthy. If we stand and watch injustice unfold, are we not also eroding the very justice we think protects us?

Matthew Bittle

(1) Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 4

(2) Operation Allied Force, was illegal in the sense that it was not sanctioned by UNSC Resolution, nor was it valid under jus ad bellum, but was arguably legitimised by its halting of the ethnic cleansing that was occuring in Kosovo.

(3) Wilde R, International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away (OUP 2008) pg.349

(4) SC Res.1244(1999) Para 11(a)

(5) “Clearing Gaza of almost 40m tonnes of rubble will take years, says UN” Jason Burke in the Guardian 15/07/2024 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/15/clearing-gaza-of-almost-40m-tonnes-of-war-rubble-will-take-years-says-un>